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Abstract 
 
This paper revisits Bartlett and Ghoshal’s transnational theory of the MNC in relation to 
multi-domestic MNCs. We argue that the aggregate level of analysis adopted by Bartlett and 
Ghoshal is unhelpful for identifying significant changes in multi-domestic MNCs at the level 
of discrete functions. We argue that a more disaggregated level of analysis is required. Our 
analysis of two cases of multi-domestic MNCs that have undertaken the global integration of 
their locally distributed purchasing functions indicates that while significant change to the 
purchasing function has occurred, at the aggregate level both MNCs remain multi-domestic. 
In both cases the decision to integrate local purchasing was regarded as having more obvious 
benefits than integrating other functions such as marketing. While both of our case multi-
domestic MNCs may in future choose to integrate other functions and develop into full-
fledged transnational companies we argue that there is no inevitability to this. Indeed global 
integration may cease with the purchasing function. A second theme in this paper is that we 
argue that Bartlett and Ghoshal’s transnational theory has a biased view of what constitutes 
effective governance mechanisms for achieving global integration, local responsiveness and 
worldwide learning and that it would greatly benefit from a more balanced application of 
hierarchical and relational governance mechanisms.  
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Introduction  
Employing a decentralized federation organization characterized by considerable local 
autonomy, multi-domestic multi-national companies (MNCs) compete by replicating their 
entire value chain in each of their foreign markets to produce locally customized products 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Yip, 1989; Roth, 1992). To the extent the global integration 
potential of the industry improves, multi-domestic MNCs will benefit from globally 
integrating their foreign operations. In general they will focus on those value-chain activities 
that offer the highest globalization potential first (Vahlne, Ivarsson and Johanson, 2011). One 
obvious initial candidate for integration is the procurement of those inputs that are common to 
most foreign units (Yeniyurt, Henke and Cavusgil, 2013). However, any such change is 
challenging for MNCs that have developed routines and structures dedicated to local 
adaptation to changing local conditions. They are confronted by a lack of MNC-wide 
networks to facilitate inter-business unit learning and an absence of appropriate hierarchical 
governance mechanisms to impose solutions that cut across the interests of individual 
business units (Gooderham, 2012).  
In the late 1980s Bartlett and Ghoshal (1987, 1989) introduced the concept of the 
transnational model of the multinational company which they argued constituted a “new 
organizational model” in the sense that its structure was “significantly different to those 
employed by MNCs over the preceding five decades” (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993:24). That 
is, whereas international companies seek to improve their performance by transferring 
technology and production closer to foreign markets, supported by a centralized federation 
organization (Dunning, 1980; Teece, 1986), and whereas global and multi-domestic 
companies may seek additional improvements either through cost-reducing global 
standardization (global companies) supported by a centralized hub organization or through 
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value-increasing local customization (multi-domestic companies), supported by a 
decentralized federation organization (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Yip, 1989; Roth, 1992), 
transnational companies seek even further improvements by combining global integration 
with local responsiveness supported by an integrated network organization. The transnational 
strategy seeks to achieve both cost-efficient global integration and value-adding local 
responsiveness, in addition to the benefit of worldwide learning and regular transfer of local 
best practice.1 
Although Bartlett and Ghoshal observed that the benefits of global integration vary 
across markets, businesses, companies, functions, and tasks they have consistently reiterated 
their assertion that “many worldwide industries were transformed in the 1980s and 1990s 
from the three established MNC forms, the multinational, international, and global forms into 
the transnational form” (Bartlett, Ghoshal and Beamish, 2008: 339). However, Harzing 
(1999) failed to find any convincing empirical support for such a pervasive transformation. 
According to Harzing, transnational companies were more likely to be born rather than to 
become transnational. While we agree with Bartlett and Ghoshal that conditions such as 
improved communications are more amenable to the transnational form, equally Harzing’s 
findings imply that these have not been sufficient in themselves to drive any large-scale 
transformation of MNCs to the transnational form. Barriers to such transformation are clearly 
manifold, including subsidiary power (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Dörrenbächer and 
Geppert, 2006; Vahlne, Ivarsson and Johanson, 2011 ), unresolved agency relations 
(Mudambi and Pedersen, 2007; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994; O’Donnell, 2000), path 
dependency (Vahlne et al, 2011), the lack of inter-business unit social networks (Martin and 
Eisenhardt, 2010; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai, 2000), the lack of bonding social capital 
                                                 
1 Bartlett and Ghoshal were by no means alone in arguing for the emergence of a “new” MNC. Similar propositions 
are found in for example Hedlund and his `heterarchy’ concept (1986, 1994), and White and Poynter’s (1990) notion of the 
`horizontal organization’. It has also received broad support from Kogut and Zander (1993), Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) 
and O’Donnel (2000) to name but a few.  
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(Burt, 1992; Adler and Kwon, 2002; Edelman, Bresnen, Newell, Scarbrough, and Swan, 
2004) , the local embeddedness of business units (Forsgren, Holm, and Johanson, 2005),  and 
the socially embedded nature of knowledge (Dimaggio and Powell,1983); Lave and Wenger, 
1991;Vygotsky, 1986;  Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola, and Lehtinen, 2004). Thus we agree 
with Vahlne et al. (2011:4) that global integration is often tortuous and proceeds through 
“incremental adjustments, with the most obvious and performance impacting changes handled 
early in the process.” In all, we argue, that it should come as no great surprise that 25 years 
after Bartlett and Ghoshal launched their transnational transformation thesis evidence of any 
such large-scale transformation is lacking. However, we contend that to disregard the 
“incremental adjustments” that Vahlne et al. (2011) refer to is to ignore significant structural 
changes to specific functions.  
The overall purpose of this paper is to argue for the importance of studying global 
integration on the functional level in multi-domestic MNCs. As such we develop a view that 
was initiated by Malnight (1995) who observed that global integration occurs at the level of 
particular functions rather than to the entire MNC. Rather than developing into full-fledged 
transnational MNCs, we argue that multi-domestic MNCs are significantly more likely to 
develop transnational capabilities in relation to specific high-potential value-chain activities. 
Further, we argue that the procurement function is a primary candidate for such integration 
and capability development. The outcome is an ambidextrous or hybrid solution resulting in a 
multi-domestic MNC with transnational capabilities limited to specific functions. The 
transnational thesis essentially ignored such a development. Its lack of attention to variations 
in global integration across functions may have caused it to “fall out of favour.”  
To support the development of transnational capabilities within functional areas, we 
argue not only for a focus on a more disaggregated activity level of analysis but also for a re-
balancing of the use of hierarchical and relational governance mechanisms. Specifically we 
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argue that while relational governance mechanisms are significant their development is 
dependent on the corporate decision to employ hierarchical governance. Without the impetus 
of hierarchical governance the lateral mechanisms that are needed for inter-unit learning will 
not emerge. In line with Harzing (1999) we further argue that there is no inevitability that a 
multi-domestic MNC that has integrated across one function will necessarily chose to 
integrate other functions. Thus we develop a significantly revised version of the transnational 
thesis that proposes that multi-domestic MNCs  may achieve global efficiency, local 
responsiveness and worldwide learning for high-potential value-chain activities at the 
functional rather than the aggregate level. Furthermore they achieve this by applying 
hierarchical as well as relational governance mechanisms.   
Our empirical setting is two Norwegian multi-domestic MNCs, Rieber & Son and 
Telenor. Both companies identified the integration of their globally dispersed purchasing 
activities as having particular potential. In order to identify those governance mechanisms 
required to achieve higher-level globally integrated purchasing we compare their early, and 
less successful, initiatives to achieve purchasing integration with their more recent, and more 
successful, initiatives.  Both cases illustrate that in the context of this single integrated 
function, cost-economizing was combined with value-increasing local responsiveness and 
worldwide learning.  
 
Purchasing Integration in Multi-domestic MNCs 
MNCs in general, but multi-domestic MNCs in particular,  are increasingly being 
challenged to compete by integrating their operating and functional activities that comprise 
dispersed value chains activities while retaining their ability to respond to local market 
conditions (Kotabe and Mudambi, 2009; Yeniyurt et al., 2013). It is argued by Yeniyurt et al., 
(2013:352) that “in contrast to other mechanisms necessary for global integration (e.g., global 
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product platforms, global talent pools, and global HR systems), global procurement has been 
enthusiastically adopted by multinationals, primarily because the benefits of uniform sourcing 
are more apparent.”   
Trent and Monczka (2003) describe the move from local purchasing to globally 
integrated and coordinated procurement as a series of evolving levels in a continuum. 
However, the implementation of the integration of purchasing units across a firm’s worldwide 
locations poses severe organizational challenges (Trautmann, Bals and Hartman 2009). 
Global procurement involves not just centralization but also the creation of lateral relations 
across geographically dispersed purchasing units. Not only do entirely new global sourcing 
capabilities have to be developed but there is the added challenge of deciding when globally 
integrated purchasing of components is advantageous and when elements of purchasing 
should remain the responsibility of the local purchasing unit (Trautman, Bals and Hartman, 
2009).  This calculation will not only involve an assessment of the profit impact and supply 
risk to individual components (Kraljic, 1983) but also of the extent to which common 
requirements and harmonized specifications are available across business units (Trent and 
Monczka, 2003). Thus while the consideration of economies of scale for a particular 
purchasing category in order to improve the overall negotiation position is important, a lack 
of sensitivity to local needs may undermine local operations. Ensuring cross-unit learning in 
order to balance these considerations is therefore critical for sourcing responsiveness 
(Yeniyurt et al., 2013).  Developing and maintaining concurrent sourcing knowledge and 
communication at the global and local levels involves creating social networks (Gooderham, 
2012). For multi-domestic MNCs that have weak social networks their development 
constitutes a critical coordination cost (Tomassen and Benito, 2009)   
Rather than considering the entire MNC, our approach is to focus our analysis on 
specific value chain activities in terms of their contribution to competitive advantage (Porter, 
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2008). Additionally we view normative social control as complementary, but still secondary, 
to the main governance mechanisms of administrative control, economic incentives and 
managerial dispute settlement, as outlined in transaction cost economics and its M-form thesis 
(Williamson, 1981; 1985).2  
 
Methodology 
Given the lack of a fully developed theory on how governance mechanisms are 
deployed by multi-domestic MNCs to deal with the challenge of developing an integrated 
purchasing function, our approach has been to engage in combined deductive/inductive theory 
building drawing on two case studies. To illustrate the relevance of developing a modified 
version of Bartlett and Ghoshal’s transnational theory of the firm (TTF) on the functional 
level, we employ on our cases to compare unsuccessful attempts at global integration of 
purchasing with successful attempts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010).  
Our case studies are derived from two Norwegian multi-domestic MNCs, Rieber & 
Son and Telenor, which are dissimilar in terms of their size and industry but similar in their 
respective decisions to respond to competitive pressure by integrating purchasing. They share 
one other commonality and that is that both initially failed to achieve integrated purchasing 
prior to a successful transition. Each of these polar samples, an unsuccessful and a successful 
effort, makes it possible to observe emergent constructs and theoretical relationships (Martin 
and Eisenhardt, 2010). In so doing we distinguish between hierarchical and relational 
governance mechanisms. Discussion and implications conclude the paper. 
Our primary source of data in Rieber & Son was a series of interviews with managers 
at corporate headquarters and its main subsidiaries in the period 2007-2013. In Telenor our 
                                                 
2 Although alternative integration candidates exist such as product development, production and marketing, 
purchasing is often chosen due to its large cost saving potentials and immediate cost saving effects. 
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primary source of data is a series of accessed interviews with mangers at corporate 
headquarters conducted in the Spring of 2013, internal management documents, internal news 
on the intranet portal, documents shared on capital market days, and a whole day workshop 
with the sourcing management team and a team of researchers. One of the authors is a Telenor 
employee.  
 
The Case of Rieber & Son (R&S) 
R&S is a MNC in the dry foods industry. In addition to its Norwegian subsidiary, 
Toro, it has a number of fully-owned foreign-based subsidiaries that it acquired during the 
1990s. The most important of these were Delecta (Poland) and Vitana (Czech Republic). In 
addition it had smaller operations in five other European countries and sales and market 
offices in a further six countries. In 2007 R&S owned 28 brands in 12 countries. Its workforce 
comprised nearly 4,000 employees of whom 1,000 were located in Norway. While Toro 
(Norway) had for many years been highly profitable, its non-Scandinavian subsidiaries were 
markedly less so. Its approach to product development was summarized as that of being “a 
local taste champion”. Marketing was also deemed purely local. In its search for sources of 
inter-subsidiary synergies it attempted to centralize production. However, these were largely 
abandoned because of the inability to reproduce the various “local taste preferences”.  In 2004 
it was decided that the only contender for integration was purchasing which was largely 
uncoordinated with each subsidiary controlling its own purchasing function.  
R&S made two attempts to integrate its purchasing. The first, the Harmonization 
Project, spanned 2004-2007, and was acknowledged by corporate and subsidiary managers 
and board members as having been largely unsuccessful. The second, the significantly more 
successful Future Purchasing, commenced September 2008 and was in the main completed by 
March 2010.  
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Under the Harmonization Project, a number of activities were implemented in order to 
take out purchasing synergies across subsidiaries. The approach was to harmonize raw 
material specification across subsidiaries and then for each category to allocate a central lead-
buyer with responsibility for sourcing across subsidiaries. For the most part these individuals 
were Norwegians located at Toro. In addition the position of Group Purchasing Director was 
established whose task was to coordinate between the purchasing departments in the 
respective subsidiaries. This position was allocated to a senior Vitana manager. To support 
these initiatives a number of supporting measures were undertaken: SAP was introduced; 
inter-subsidiary networks for marketing and sales managers were formed; annual two day 
strategy meetings for subsidiary heads were organized.  
A feature of the Harmonization project was that no subsidiary was to be obliged to go 
against its business judgment and use the central lead-buyers. In other words each subsidiary 
had the latitude to decide the degree to which it was in their interest to employ the services of 
the central lead-buyers. At its launch at a gathering of subsidiary managers the project and its 
core idea of using central lead-buyers was generally greeted positively.  However, despite this 
initial reaction, by the end of the project the subsidiaries had on the whole opted to continue 
to use local buyers. Because product development continued to be done locally, it was 
generally the case that business units considered it more efficient to use their respective local 
buyers rather than the central lead buyer. Not only were the communication opportunities 
significantly greater but mutual understanding was already established. At Vitana and Delecta 
an important aspect to this mutual understanding was that local purchasers were significantly 
more cost conscious than central lead-buyers based at Toro in affluent Norway.     
This lack of confidence or trust on the part of Vitana managers in the central lead-
buyers based at Toro was experienced in reverse by one of the few central lead-buyers located 
outside of Toro. Based at Vitana, his perception was that the view of managers at Toro was 
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that “anything that originated from the Czech Republic was by definition sub-standard.” As 
the Unification project concluded his experience was that rather than consulting with him 
“Toro managers would simply buy what they wanted behind my back”. As a senior manager 
at R&S with long-term experience of purchasing for Toro emphasized, “the challenge for a 
purchaser is to get the precise quality needs of the subsidiary right. Otherwise the (local) 
brand suffers.” Furthermore, getting the quality right depends not only on understanding the 
needs of the subsidiary but also on communicating these to suppliers. His experience was that 
getting the supplier relationship to work could take as much as two years of steady interaction 
(see e.g. Johanson and Vahlne, 2009).   
As the Harmonization project came to an end the view of managers at R&S was that 
the managing directors (MDs) of the various subsidiaries had failed to identify with its 
potential. One senior R&S manager ascribed this in part to their lack of involvement in the 
Harmonization project and in part to their remuneration being exclusively calculated on the 
basis of their local performance rather than on the basis of group-level performance. The view 
from the subsidiaries was that a unified group mentality across R&S remained 
underdeveloped.   
 The R&S board decided to engage in a second and, what it signalled, would be 
a final attempt at achieving group-wide purchasing integration. As a first step it initiated a 
purchasing and supply management (PSM) analysis conducted by external consultants from 
McKinsey. The PSM analysis benchmarked the group’s overall PSM performance against 
other MNCs in the same industry. The McKinsey analysis concluded that purchasing 
represented an unexploited cost savings potential of NOK 300 million. On the basis of the 
McKinsey analysis the board took the decision to launch Future Purchasing starting early 
September 2008. The core aim of Future Purchasing was to integrate direct purchasing across 
the group. This would mean transforming the highly decentralized structure of the group. At 
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the same time, the board reiterated the need for each subsidiary to be its respective country’s 
“local taste champion”. 
Whereas the Harmonization project had been loosely structured the board was 
determined that Future Purchasing was to have a clear structure from the outset. Each 
purchasing category was assigned a management team by the Future Purchasing project 
organization which also had the responsibility for monitoring the progress of the category 
teams and reporting its findings to R&S corporate management. Each category team was to 
comprise about five category experts who would also have access to advice from an external 
purchasing consultancy.  The category teams were charged with defining the group-wide 
needs within each category and signing new group-wide contracts with new suppliers.  
In March 2010 our findings indicated that the initial scepticism to Future Purchasing 
that was prevalent across the various subsidiaries had largely evaporated. The Project Director 
viewed Future Purchasing as having delivered on its targets and as having been perceived as 
having done so by the subsidiary MDs. Not only had the category teams worked well together 
but they had “created a lot of purchasing knowledge.” One senior R&S manager observed that 
Future Purchasing had been so successful that McKinsey regarded it as an exemplar of “how 
things should be done.”  
 
The Distinctive Elements of Future Purchasing 
Hierarchical mechanisms 
Governance reconfiguration – The General Management Team (GMT) 
When R&S’s new CEO joined the company in late September 2008 his first action 
was to conduct one-to-one meetings with each of the MDs of the main subsidiaries. He 
explicitly requested that they act on behalf of the whole business rather than their own 
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subsidiaries. Late October 2008 he presented a two-page memo to subsidiary MDs, “From a 
food conglomerate to an integrated food company”. However, a much more substantial action 
by the new CEO was his decision to form an entirely new GMT which, in addition to himself, 
the CFO, the head of human resources, the director of marketing and sales and the new supply 
chain director included the MDs of the main subsidiaries. For the first time in the history of 
R&S subsidiary managers were now integrated in the corporate centre. From December 2008 
the GMT held monthly meetings in different locations supplemented by telephone 
conferences half way through each month. At each and every GMT meeting the Project 
Director of Future Purchasing reported on the progress of the project including any personnel 
issues that had arisen in the wake of manning the category teams.  
At its outset the new GMT was a brittle entity.  One senior manager recalled 
“innumerable meetings” with the CEO “hammering home Future Purchasing”. Unlike under 
the Harmonization project it was now no longer the case that subsidiaries could use their local 
needs as “an excuse for inaction”.  Such was the pressure from the CEO that those who 
opposed Future Purchasing thought “it wise to keep their scepticism to themselves”. Overall 
what we observe at R&S is governance reconfiguration. The fiefdom mentality of the 
subsidiary MDs is not only challenged but the MDs are incorporated in a new group-wide 
governance mechanism. GMT meetings are an arena for exchanging views, for developing a 
common vision of the group and for reaching common binding decisions.  
Realignment of rewards  
Coupled to the new GMT was a fresh approach to MD compensation. Whereas the 
former system had been primarily local in its orientation, rewarding subsidiary MDs on the 
basis of their unit’s performance, the new CEO introduced a new rewards system that to a 
significant extent rewarded the subsidiary MDs on the basis of overall group performance.  
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Rolling measures of outcomes 
Part of the design of Future Purchasing comprised the regular monitoring by a 
controller of each category team in order to objectively identify tangible savings. Thereafter 
these unambiguous outcomes were immediately communicated to the GMT by the Program  
Director. The communication of “early wins” (i.e. immediate substantial savings) to the GMT 
not only persuaded subsidiary MDs that Future Purchasing was working but it even generated 
a conviction that further integration was both possible and desirable.  
Mandated category teams 
The overall task of the category teams was very similar to the task assigned to the 
central lead-buyers of the Harmonization project. It was to define the group-wide needs 
within each purchasing category and then to sign new contracts with suppliers on behalf of 
the group. However, in operational terms there were profound differences. The R&S approach 
to the operational integration of purchasing in the Harmonization Project was to appoint 
central lead-buyers for the various purchasing categories and to provide them with 
authorization to invite cooperation from the purchasing managers based in the various 
subsidiaries. The approach of Future Purchasing to developing category teams was not to 
devolve the responsibility for forming them but to centralize it. Category teams were formed 
at the outset of each phase of Future Purchasing with designated team members covering a 
variety of relevant competencies including production, product development, logistics and 
marketing. Furthermore, unlike the Harmonization project where central lead-buyers 
remained in their regular purchasing roles, category team leaders were designated on a full-
time basis while the team members were to spend an average of 60 per cent of their working 
week on category team-related activities.  
Category team appointments were subject to GMT scrutiny and monitoring. The 
boundaries of the category teams had in effect been buffered by the GMT against disruptive, 
15 
  
competing tasks thereby “enabling its members to work outside of their normal functions and 
to work across both functions and geographies.”  
 
Relational Mechanisms 
Inter-subsidiary Category Teams  
The Harmonization project was spearheaded by central lead-buyers who for the most 
part were Norwegians located at Toro. The view of non-Toro colleagues was that they failed 
to understand their idiosyncratic local needs. Equally in relation to colleagues at Toro the 
central lead-buyer located at Vitana fared no better. The approach to Future Purchasing was 
very different to that of the Harmonization project in that it aimed to form inter-subsidiary 
category teams. In so doing, Future Purchasing created arenas for the exchange and sharing of 
local purchasing knowledge.  
Bridging Category Teams  
The category teams of Future Purchasing were specifically instructed to interact not 
just with suppliers but with local stake holders across the group. Furthermore, their success in 
doing this was monitored by the Project Director and the GMT. By contrast bridging ties were 
not an explicit priority of the Harmonization project.  
On the whole, according to the supply chain manager,  these arenas worked well and 
resulted in projected cost savings (NOK 300 mill) being realized, the half of which by means 
of effective contract renegotiation in the project phase (2008-2010), and the remaining half 
also from volume concentration and supplier switching in the post-project phase (2010 – 
2012). 
16 
  
The Case of Telenor  
Telenor is one of the larger mobile operators in the world with more than 150 million 
mobile subscriptions. From being a legacy Norwegian state owned company, Telenor now has 
operations in 14 counties that can be grouped into three areas: Scandinavia, Central and 
Eastern-Europe and South-East Asia. It is headquartered in Norway. Telenor’s corporate 
policy has been to treat each business unit as a stand-alone operation. Until 2008 integration 
initiatives were limited to knowledge transfer when establishing new operations and modest 
attempts at creating knowledge sharing arenas for on-going operations.  
At this point corporate management responded to increasing competitive pressures and 
began to consider the global integration of selected functions. It recognized that the core of 
mobile telcos is to purchase, configure and operate standardized technology to run the 
telecom engine and then to effectively sell and distribute services through multiple channels 
with appurtenant customer service. Whereas marketing, service composition and distribution 
need to remain locally adapted purchasing could be undertaken globally. However, it was not 
until 2010 that corporate management finally concluded that globally integrated purchasing 
had significant potential. In 2012, a new souring organization was established. The financial 
ambition of this move is to realize savings of 3 BNOK by the end of 2015.  
 
Phase 1 – Group Procurement as a Corporate Centre of Excellence 
Group Procurement was originally set up in 2001 as a centre of excellence located at 
corporate headquarters to support and coordinate the purchasing functions located in each of 
the business units. The initial voluntary coordination of purchasing cases of telco equipment 
across BUs improved the negotiation power and significant benefits were achieved. During 
the mid-2000s, Group Procurement attempted to create a corporate policy for procurement. 
The autonomous BUs ignored this attempt and by 2008 it was recognized by corporate 
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management that Group Procurement was failing to engage local purchasing managers in 
terms of gaining their trust and support for a centrally developed procurement strategy. 
Business unit informants reported that Group Procurement lacked a sufficient understanding 
of the local culture and business model. The result as expressed by a Group Procurement 
informant was: “There was nobody who wanted our purchasing strategy or support. The 
business units wanted us to sit here at headquarters and not interfere with their local business. 
We decided that we had to rethink our role and focus.”  
Responding both to failure but also to corporate management’s strategy for global 
purchasing integration Group Procurement developed an entirely new approach that 
started with a thorough analysis of the needs of the local procurement functions. One 
major commonality that was identified was all of the business units needed to modernize 
their mobile networks in order to make the transition from voice to mobile data. Group 
Procurement decided to concentrate their efforts on meeting this one common need. 
However, the response from the business units was entirely negative. According to a 
Group Purchasing informant “they did not want anything to do with us”. Attitudes only 
changed as Group Procurement demonstrated its capabilities in conjunction with 
Telenor’s greenfield entry into India in 2009 when the entire ‘telecom machine’ had to 
be swiftly purchased and rolled out in an extremely competitive market. For the India 
entry Group Procurement succeeded in achieving the lowest prices on infrastructure 
equipment ever witnessed at Telenor. 
 
Phase 2 – Series of Group Wide Global Sourcing Projects 
Despite misgivings, on the back of the tangible achievements in India, Telenor’s 
Norway business unit granted Group Procurement the opportunity to contribute to its network 
modernization. Bold moves were undertaken by Group Procurement that replaced two 
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European vendors with a single Chinese vendor, Huawei. In this move Telenor was the first 
western telco to opt for Huawei. For the period 2010 to 2015 the estimated result was savings 
in relation to previous cost levels of the order of 10-12 BNOK for the whole Telenor group. 
Based on the successes of Global Procurement in India corporate management recognized that 
integrated purchasing was both feasible and necessary. Many of the business units shared this 
analysis and began to actively cooperate with Group Procurement  
New cases for global purchasing were identified such as modems, SIM cards, 
antennas, and microwave equipment that were purchased and used in all business units. For 
the individual business unit the savings on any one of these items were not significant, but 
taken together they amounted to considerable savings for Telenor as a whole. Deploying 
small category teams comprising relevant specialists the purchasing of equipment was 
bundled thereby fully utilizing Telenor’s overall scale. One outcome was aggressive 
competition between vendor partners that led to the total number of vendor partners being 
significantly reduced. The upshot for Telenor was that unit prices dropped between 50 and 60 
per cent.   
A feature of the globally led sourcing projects at this stage was that the participation 
of the business units remained voluntary. Group Procurement had to continuously 
demonstrate the benefits of global purchasing to the business units, a process that was costly 
not least in terms of time. In the spring of 2012 corporate management felt sufficiently 
confident that Group Procurement had developed the necessary global purchasing capabilities 
and the trust of business units to move to new stage. One of the members of Group 
Procurement recalled:  “From GEM (corporate management) we were challenged: what could 
we achieve if we could build the sourcing organization from scratch? What would sourcing 
then look like?”  
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Phase 3 – Sourcing 3.0 
In response to this challenge a new purchasing function, Global Sourcing, was 
established in September 2012 that operated under the slogan ‘one integrated global 
organization’. When launching it, Jon Fredrik Baksaas, Group President and CEO said: “Co-
ordinated sourcing has delivered good results during the recent years and we see that there is 
still a large potential to tap into.”  
The centralized Group Souring function was set up to address three main areas. First, 
purchasing of strategic investments was centralized to ensure the adoption and execution of 
effective purchasing solutions. Second, purchasing of standardized goods was coordinated 
centrally to utilize Telenor’s scale to achieve lower prices. To achieve scale, Global Sourcing 
had to engage in internal standardization processes of product specifications. Third, Group 
Sourcing was tasked with providing best practice purchasing solutions and support to local 
business unit sourcing functions who remained engaged in the purchasing of local services. 
As Bjørn Harald Brodersen, Head of Global Sourcing stated: “We will continue to have 
strong and qualified sourcing teams in each Business Unit, but strengthen the coordination 
across the Group”.  Apart from the need to maintain local responsiveness in regard to 
purchasing in response to purely local needs, Telenor seeks to ensure that each business 
retains a significant proportion of its stand-alone capabilities in order to maintain the strategic 
option of divestment to any part of its portfolio.   
 
20 
  
The Distinctive Elements of Sourcing 3.0  
Hierarchical mechanisms 
Governance reconfiguration – restructuring the organization 
When the Global Sourcing function was established in 2012 the governance and 
organization structure was changed to speed up decision processes, support transparency and 
facilitate collaboration, and better manage the resource base and working procedures. The 
change project prior to the establishment of Global Sourcing revealed multiple sourcing 
hierarchies and multiple sets of working procedures.  
Prior to Global Sourcing, local purchasing departments reported to a local executive.  
Post Global Sourcing, sourcing personnel employed by local business units report directly to 
Global Souring with only a ‘dotted reporting line’ to their local business unit top 
management. The new governance model provided Global Sourcing with the formal means to 
effectively coordinate all sourcing activities across the various business units.   
Realignment of KPIs, measures of outcomes and rewards 
The change project identified a variety of goals, key performance indicators (KPIs) 
and plans across the business units. Sourcing and finance at corporate headquarters 
collaborated closely to define how savings were to be calculated and measured. The 
management initiated changes to KPIs, spend and saving definitions, sign-off sheets and 
reporting tools. The sign-off sheets were used as a means to commit stakeholders by having 
them sign a document that showed how much in savings were going to be achieved. These 
savings figures were then followed up in the reporting phase. The new souring planning 
process was integrated with the business planning processes. New KPIs were introduced as a 
motivation mechanism that balances corporate and local needs. Bonus agreements were 
aligned with the new KPIs to create incentives to act accordingly.  
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Relational mechanisms 
Global Category Teams 
Teams that draw on employees located across business units were established in order 
to ensure relevant expertise for each product or service category.  Local sourcing staff is 
allocated to one or more category teams each of which has a dedicated leader. Each category 
team operates as a virtual team. To overcome the significant geographical distances involved 
knowledge and procedures are codified and standardized. The category teams safeguard 
Telenor’s ability to develop and maintain sufficient competences within each purchasing 
category.   
Bridging central and local Category Teams 
Global Sourcing makes extensive use of collaborative technology tools as a way to 
share updated documents and procedures as a means to coordinate across business units.  It is 
common that members of category teams have never physically met, but they regularly have 
virtual meetings supported by real-time document sharing and phone-conferences. To 
mitigate cultural differences, selected local BU sourcing employees are inpatriated to work at 
global headquarters on 1-2 year contracts. These inpatriate assignments involve on-the-job 
training and experience from working with colleagues from various business units. Global 
Sourcing employs one person who is tasked with attending all of their management team 
meetings and who is responsible for ensuring information sharing across all purchasing 
operations.  
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Summary of Findings 
Global integration benefits derive from enhanced scale and scope economies (cost savings) 
and by concentrating production of common inputs on significantly fewer vendors.  As both 
cases show, resistance to global integration of purchasing only decreases under significant 
pressure from corporate forces. Such resistance to integration is to a large extent caused by 
local managers’ perceptions of the relative costs and benefits associated with such integration. 
Such costs derive primarily from the need for more standardization which often, but not 
always, means less responsiveness to local conditions. While these costs are readily conceived 
by business unit managers the benefits of purchasing integration for the MNC as a whole are 
less obvious to them.   
Further, both cases suggest that purely voluntary approaches to integrated purchasing 
that rely on relational governance are ineffective. In moving to globally integrated purchasing 
both companies only achieved global integration of purchasing by employing hierarchical, 
corporate driven common purchasing initiatives that created a sufficient number of successes 
that objectively demonstrated significant cost savings for local business unit as well as the 
MNC as a whole. At that stage centralized purchasing organizations could be developed.  
In both MNCs the model that was adopted for achieving centralized purchasing 
involved horizontal coordination in the form of globally dispersed category teams actively 
supported by hierarchical governance in the form of corporate category managers, supervised 
by Group Sourcing central management. This model shares many of the characteristics of the 
transnational model in that it combines local responsiveness with global efficiency and 
worldwide learning (see Table 1 below). However, the model is at the functional rather than 
the aggregate level and is predicated on the explicit use of hierarchical governance 
mechanisms.   
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    TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
As indicated in the Table common to both MNCs what emerged was a hybrid form of 
organization with a centralized hub structure for purchasing interlinked with a decentralized 
federation structure for other functions. Responsiveness to local purchasing needs and 
conditions was taken care of by BU Sourcing whereas the global efficiency was the main 
responsibility of Group Sourcing. In both MNCs valuable purchasing knowledge was 
developed by global category teams and diffused across business units.  
 
Discussion  
Contrary to Bartlett and Ghoshal’s transnationalization thesis, we have argued that 
multi-domestic MNCs will generally not engage in aggregate level transformation to the 
transnational form. In line with Vahlne et al., (2011) we expect integration in multi-domestic 
MNCs to be limited to those functions that have the most tangible impact on performance. 
Further, in line with Yeniyurt et al., (2013), we have argued that purchasing is the most 
obvious function for multi-domestic MNCs to engage with because in comparison with for 
example marketing or product development the benefits of uniform sourcing in terms of cost 
savings are significantly more apparent. While procurement is a natural first candidate for 
global integration other value chain activities such as technology development, marketing, 
and after sales services may follow drawing on the organizational capabilities initially 
developed for procurement. However, there is no inevitability to this. In that Harzing’s (1999) 
research failed to identify any aggregate transformation of multi-domestic MNCs to 
transnationals this position is not novel. What is more novel is our argument that within the 
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multi-domestic model profound changes can occur at the level of discrete functions. Although 
Malnight (1995:121) argued along these lines nearly two decades ago it remains the case that 
“there has been limited investigation of the process within firms as they move toward 
integrated network structures.”  
Our two cases indicate that at the functional level multi-domestic MNCs can achieve 
the three key success capabilities - local responsiveness, global integration and worldwide 
learning – associated with the transnational model. However, our analysis indicates that this 
achievement is not just the product of the development of a “shared management 
understanding” in the sense of common values and “nonparochial personalities” as supposed 
by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1995:483). Our findings correspond with Yeniyurt et al.’s (2013: 
351-362) observation in regard to purchasing integration: “As with any important endeavour, 
the success of an effective and efficient globally integrated organization begins with having 
the full and active support and leadership of top management” Thus we observed that 
“voluntarism” resulted in initial failure for both case MNCs. Instead the transformation of 
purchasing was dependent on hierarchical initiatives that generated objectively positive 
results that appealed to the self-interest of local business unit managers.   
 
 
  
25 
  
References 
Adler, P. S. & Kwon, S. W. (2002). Social capital: Prospects for a new concept. Academy of 
Management Review, 27(1): 17-40. 
 
Bartlett, C. & Ghoshal, S. (1987). "Managing Across Borders: New Organizational 
Responses," Sloan Management Review (Fall) 
 
Bartlett, C.A. & Ghoshal, S. (1989). Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution.  
Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Bartlett, C.A. & Ghoshal, S. (1993). Beyond the M-form: Toward a managerial theory of the 
firm. Strategic Management Journal, 14 (Issue S2): 23-46. 
 
Bartlett, C.A. & Ghoshal, S. (1995). Transnational Management. Text, Cases and Readings in 
Cross-Border Management. Chicago: Irwin.2nd edition. 
 
Bartlett, C.A., Ghoshal, S. & Beamish, P.W. (2008). Transnational Management. Text, Cases 
and Readings in Cross-Border Management. Chicago: MacGraw-Hill, 5th edition. 
 
Birkinshaw, J. & Morrison A.J. (1995). Configurations of Strategy and Structure in 
Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 26 (4): 
729-753. 
 
Bouquet, C. & Birkinshaw, J. (2008). Managing power in the multinational corporation: How 
low-power actors gain influence. Journal of Management, 34(3), 477-508. 
 
Burt, R. S. (1992).  Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition.  Cambridge, 
MA.,Harvard University Press. 
 
Dimaggio, P. J. & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited – institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological 
Review, 48(2): 147-160. 
 
Dörrenbächer, C. & Geppert, M. (2006). Micro-politics and conflicts in multinational 
corporations: Current debates, re-framing, and contributions of this special issue. Journal of 
International Management 12(3), 251–265. 
 
Dunning, J. H. (1980). Towards an eclectic theory of international production: Some 
empirical tests. Journal of International Business Studies, 11 (1), 9–31. 
 
Edelman, L. F., Bresnen, M., Newell, S., Scarbrough, H. & Swan, J. (2004). The benefits and 
pitfalls of social capital: Empirical evidence from two organizations in the United Kingdom. 
British Journal of Management, 15(1): 59-69. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management 
Review, 4: 532-550. 
 
Forsgren, M., Holm, U. & Johanson, J. (2005). Managing the Embedded Multinational. 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
26 
  
 
Gooderham, P.N. (2012). The transition from a multi-domestic to globally integrated 
multinational enterprise – in an industry where local taste matters. European Journal of 
International Management, 6(2),175-198. 
 
Hakkarainen, K., Palonen, T., Paavola, S. & Lehtinen, E. (2004). Communities of  
Networked Expertise: Professional and Educational Perspectives (1st ed.). London: Elsevier. 
 
Harzing, A-W. (1999). Managing the Multinationals. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Hedlund, (1986). The hypermodern MNC - A heterarchy? Human Resource Management, 25 
(1): 9-35. 
 
Hedlund (1994) A model of the knowledge management and the N-form corporation.  
Strategic Management Journal, 15 (Summer, Special Issue): 73-90.  
 
Johanson , J. & Vahlne, J-E. (2009). The Uppsala internationalization process model 
revisited: From liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 40(9), 1411-1431. 
 
Kogut, , B. and Zander, U. (1993) Knowledge of the firm and the evolutionary theory of the 
multinational corporation’, Journal of International Business Studies 24: 625–645. 
 
Kotabe, M. & Mudambi, R. (2009). Global sourcing and value creation: Opportunities and 
challenges. Journal of International Management, 15, 121–125. 
 
Kraljic, P. (1983). Purchasing must become supply management. Harvard Business Review, 
61(5), 109-118. 
 
Lave, J. & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Malnight, T.W., (1995). Globalization of an ethnocentric firm: an evolutionary perspective. 
Strategic Management Journal, 16 (2), 119–141. 
 
Martin, J.A. & Eisenhardt, K.M. (2010). Rewiring: Cross-subsidiary collaborations in 
multibusiness organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 53(2), 265-301. 
 
Mudambi, R. & Pedersen, T. (2007). Agency theory and resource dependency theory: 
Complementary explanations for subsidiary power in multinational corporations. Copenhagen 
Business School. SMG Working Paper No. 5/2007. 
 
Nahapiet, J. & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational 
advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(2): 242-266. 
 
Nohria, N. & Ghoshal, S. (1994). Differentiated fit and shared values: Alternatives for 
managing headquarters-subsidiary relations. Strategic Management Journal, 15(6): 491-502. 
 
O’Donnell, S. (2000). Managing foreign subsidiaries: Agents of headquarters, or an 
independent network? Strategic Management Journal, 2(5), 525-548. 
27 
  
 
Porter  M.E. (2008). Competing across locations, in, On Competition, Updated and Expanded 
Edition. Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2008: 305-344. 
 
Roth, K. (1992). Implementing international strategy at the subsidiary level: the role of 
managerial decision-making characteristics.  Journal of Management, 18(4), 769-789. 
 
Teece, D. J. (1986). Transaction cost economics and the multinational enterprise: An 
assessment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7(1), 21–45. 
 
Tomassen, S. & Benito, G. (2009). The costs of governance in international companies. 
International Business Review, 18(3), 292-304 
 
Trautmann, G., Bals, L. & Hartmann, E. (2009). Integration in the global sourcing 
organization – an information processing perspective. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 
45(2), 57-74. 
 
Trent, R. J. & Monczka, R. M. (2003). International purchasing and global sourcing - What 
are the differences? Journal of Supply Chain Management, 39(4) 26-36. 
 
Tsai, W. 2000. Social capital, strategic relatedness and the formation of intraorganizational 
linkages. Strategic Management Journal, 21: 925-939. 
 
Vahlne, J-E, Ivarsson, I., & Johanson, J. (2011). The tortuous road to globalization for 
Volvo’s heavy truck business: Extending the scope of the Uppsala model. International 
Business Review, 20(1), 1-14. 
 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). Thought and Language. MIT Press Cambridge, Mass. 
 
White, R. E. & T. A. Poynter (1990). Organizing for worldwide advantage. In C. Bartlett, Y. 
Doz and G. Hedlund (eds.), Managing the Global Firm.Routledge, New York, pp. 95-113. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1981). The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes. Journal of 
Economic Literature, (December 1981): 1537 – 1568.  
 
Williamson, O.E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press. 
 
Yeniyurt, S., Henke Jr. J.W. & Cavusgil, E. (2013). Integrating global and local procurement 
for superior supplier working relations. International Business Review, 22(2), 351-362.  
 
Yip, G. (1989). Global strategy - In a world of nations? Sloan Management Review, (Fall): 
29-41. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
  
 
Table 1. Key Success Capabilities of Purchasing Integration 
 Key Success Capabilities  
   Global Integration  
 
MNC Organization  
 
Local 
Responsiveness 
Global 
Efficiency 
Worldwide 
Learning 
Preliminary 
Results 
Hierarchically 
governed and 
horizontally 
coordinated 
purchasing within a 
decentralized 
federation structure 
 
(a hybrid form 
combining 
decentralized 
federation with 
centralized hub) 
BU Sourcing:  
reports  
dotted line to BU 
management and 
solid line to   
Group Sourcing; 
makes routine call-
off to global 
framework 
agreements;  
makes purchases  
for local BUs; 
represents Group 
Sourcing in local 
BUs 
 
 
 
Group 
Sourcing: 
standardizes 
and aggregates 
common inputs 
(developed by 
Global 
Category 
Teams);  
negotiates 
global 
contracts with 
global suppliers 
offering large 
volume 
discounts  
Global  
Category  
Teams:  
develop  
global  
sourcing 
categories;  
discovers,  
and  
transmits   
best   
purchasing 
practice 
Cost savings:  
 
according to 
project plans 
 
